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Abstract  
 The Kosovo War in the 1990s was one among a series of wars in the 
former Yugoslav federation. It was the final war that ended the dissolution 
which had started with Slovenia from1990 to 1991, Croatia and Bosnia - 
Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995 and the Kosovo War from 1998 to 1999. 
However, the Kosovo war happened during a different situation and period. 
It was at a time and in a position to cause the domino effect in the Balkans 
and an outbreak of wars in a large part of the Balkans. This fight could 
include Albania and Macedonia as nations with an ethnic Albanian 
population. It could also have a religious or cultural impact that threatened to 
involve other states such as Bosnia and Turkey on the one hand and Greece 
on the other. The interest of major countries in Europe, as well as the world, 
was focused on this war. A country among them was the UK. As one of the 
founding states of the European Union, United Nations, and NATO, the UK 
was quite involved in this war. The UK and the US were two countries that 
became the political and military leadership in this struggle since its 
beginning, while reaching a peak in 1999. This situation involved talks in the 
British Parliament in the UK, especially the House of Lords where the 
decision-making aspect of parliamentary politics is achieved. The war was 
also a major concern for the parliament. On the one hand, it was important to 
resolve the situation in Kosovo without worsening it with other massacres. 
On the other hand, this situation required caution in dealing with the Serbian 
people. The destiny of Kosovo refugees was important to them.  However, 
the future of the Serbian people in Kosovo had to be guaranteed. The most 
important thing was to obtain full autonomy for Kosovo, but also to achieve 
a bilateral cooperation from both countries. The House of Lords and the 
interest of some lords in this war made the British policy, as a whole, a lot 
more responsible for accomplishing what it had started since diplomacy 
regarding weapons and the military intervention used to manage the situation 
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of refugees in Kosovo had a huge impact in Europe. The British 
parliamentary sessions were very crucial in leading to an international level 
this whole historical phase for Kosovo. 
 
Keywords: British parliament, Kosovo, Serbia, Albania 
 
In the context of British interests 
 Involvement in turmoil for more than a decade led Kosovo to the 
peak of its suffering and conflict in 1999. The conflict between the Albanian 
population and the Serbian-Yugoslav political actors had begun in early 1998 
and had an impact that was greater than the peninsula, including the 
continent as well as a political area larger than the continent itself.  One 
should mention here some national institutions as was the example of the 
British Parliament. 
 The beginning of 1999 was not a favorable period for Albania. By 15 
January 1999, there was a massacre which will be known as the Racak 
massacre.  In this village, the Serbian army together with the paramilitaries 
massacred 45 people, including women and children (Ivo H. Daalder and 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, 2000). OSCE Head of Mission William Walker, who 
had visited the village, declared that it was a real horror scene. The British 
Parliament gave a strong response three days later. Drewienkiewicz, the 
British representative of OSCE, stated without hesitation that it was a 
civilian massacre because none of the casualties was wearing military 
uniforms. (Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, 1999) They also knew that this was 
an order from above because the same situation had occurred in Bosnia and 
all the wars of the former Yugoslavia. (Lord Beloff, 1999)  
 However, the British Parliament would consider many later crimes as 
massacres based on their number and their psychological impact as well. A 
historical connotation was given to them when compared to similar 
massacres throughout human history. For many lords, these events were 
similar to the Armenian massacres of 1915 (The Earl of Shannon, 1999) 
because Serbs used to say that Albanians migrated to Kosovo. As a result, 
Serbs wanted to execute ethnic cleansing. Many Serbian deputies denied that 
the massacres had begun after the NATO’s bombing because they were 
already informed that around 250,000 people had left Kosovo in 1998. (Mr. 
Crick Howell, 1999) They had noted an increase in the number of massacres 
and deportations from Kosovo in early bombing phases. (The Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness 
Symons of Vernham Dean, 1999) 
 With the failure of the Rambouillet Meeting, this situation provided 
enough evidence to NATO and the British government that the last resort to 
stop the massacres was to initiate bombing. Shortly before the bombing, 
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British Defense Minister George Robertson stated that there were about 6000 
police officers and 20,000 military troops in Kosovo. (Ivo H. Daalder and 
Michael E. O’Hanlon, 2000) The aim of the attacks, according to him, was to 
lessen the degree of violence toward civilians in Kosovo. (Ivo H. Daalder 
and Michael E. O’Hanlon, 2000) Genocide and massacres of the population 
were not a mere internal issue of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. (Paul 
Latawski and Martin A. Smith, 2003) In the same way, throughout the first 
half of 1999, the British government stated that it was an act of genocide 
inKosovo from the Serbian part, and there was no other explanation for their 
actions. (Mick Hume, 2000) 
 The idea for a solution via a potential military attack was already 
discussed in the House of Commons since January 14, a day before the 
massacre in Racak. However, this was considered an impossible scenario 
since the troops that were present in Macedonia belonged to the mediation 
troops between Serbs and Kosovars and not to a third party. (The 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean), 1999) After reprisals on people and 
the failure of the Rambouillet talks, NATO started bombings on 24 March 
1999. The British Minister of Defense declared in Parliament that the 
situation in Kosovo was like in the Middle Ages and not as on the verge of 
XXI century. It was not a matter between the people of Yugoslavia and 
them, but they wanted Slobodan Milosevic to withdraw from those actions. 
(The Minister of State, Ministry of Defense (Lord Gilbert), 1999) The British 
government also declared that it would stop after the withdrawal of the 
Serbian troops in Kosovo. (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, 1999) This 
statement, in a threatening style, expressed stability. The British government 
held this statement until early June when the Yugoslav government accepted 
the terms. The British and the American government were the first to propel 
submarines in the Adriatic Sea and bombed on the first night. (Bruce R. 
Nardulli et al., 1999).This war had such a strong impact on the British 
government that Lord Robertson in October 1999 in Institute for Strategic 
Studies in London stated that whenever you ask me whether this war was the 
right thing, I will be positive. (William M. Arkin, 2001) 
 However, the British parliament had MPs who did not see the war 
with the same optics as the British government. A part of the deputies who 
were against British involvement in the war tried to link the war with other 
experiences of their country's involvement in wars. Even before the 
bombing, many thought it could be like the Vietnam War, where one went 
for a little and stood for a long time. (Lord Burnham, 1999)The lack of 
military numbers was also a major problem along with internal problems that 
could follow. Earl Trenchard believed that the extent of the British army was 
at its maximum, and involvement in Kosovo would put a strain on the British 
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people, especially if this engagement were for a long time. (Vikont 
Trenchard, 1999) These controversies are started becoming more prominent 
from time to time due to geostrategic interests, especially about national 
security. The British Minister of Defense Lord Gilbert declares at the end of 
May that we will stay in Kosovo only throughout the first phase of the return 
of Kosovars, then will gradually retire, leaving the room for countries, in 
geographical terms, closer to Kosovo. (The Minister of State, Ministry of 
Defense (Lord Gilbert), 1999) 
 Nevertheless, the British government, despite objections in 
parliament with some influence, was decisive in its involvement in the 
NATO bombing. Tony Blair stated that even alone would undertake these 
attacks to stand for the universal values of protecting the most vulnerable. 
(Charlotte Wagnsson, 2008) The insistence of Prime Minister Blair was also 
due to the support he had in parliament, where his party had about 179 
chairs. Having a larger majority gave him confidence and support in the 
country, compared to other allies of NATO, which did not have this 
advantage. (Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon, 1999) 
 
The perception of the Kosovo war 
 All the blame fell on Slobodan Milosevic since early 1999. 
According to the British parliament, he did not properly manage the situation 
in the country by causing massacres and large migrations of Kosovars. (The 
Secretary of State for Defense (Mr. George Robertson), 1999) They were 
also critical in the Paris talks between Serbs and Kosovars, where Albanians 
had only accepted self-determination for Kosovo within Yugoslavia, but the 
Serbian group did not agree. Milosevic was to blame since he had given the 
order. (Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, 1999) He was considered as a person 
who had requested, through diplomatic, negotiations to gain time, since 
shortly after Paris talks, he ordered Serb troops to commit ethnic cleansing. 
(Baroness Jay of Paddington, 1999)This operation was known as "Patkova" 
(Horseshoe). (Benjamin S. Lambeth, 2001) It is seen as a retaliatory action 
against NATO, because, after every bombing by NATO till the end of April, 
there was a reprisal in Kosovo. (Lord Kennet, 1999) However, the British 
government with Baroness Simon said in the House of Commons that we do 
not aim to remove Milosevic from power; this right belongs to the Serbian 
people if they wish to keep or overthrow the government. (Baroness Symons 
of Vernham Dean, 1999) It was in the wake of statements made at the 
beginning of the bombing with the goal to diminish the military repression 
toward Kosovars. The British Parliament had also come to a conclusion that 
the operations had reached a peak to pure ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. 
 The impact of these bombings on the Serbian people in the context of 
an assessment of whether the bombing was appropriate or not was highly 
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important to the British parliament. Since the early days of the bombing, 
many MPs were concerned if the bombings would have an impact on the 
Serbian people; if they would decrease or increase the support of the 
governance of Slobodan Milosevic. Since these bombings would affect 
civilians, they knew that civilians would not understand them as NATO 
groups did. After this action, many feared whether this country would tend to 
move more toward the East. (Lord Rodgers of Quarry Bank, 1999) Many old 
deputies knew that the Serbs were a proud people and would not easily be 
defeated. They knew that the Serbs in the previous wars had faced the armies 
many times greater than theirs. Nevertheless, the British Defense Ministry 
did not necessarily share this idea. Lord Gilbert stated that the three most 
important points were in their favor. First, generals noticed that the Serbian 
logistics, being destroyed, could not compare to the British one. Second, 
officers also believed that the chance to make a military career was almost 
impossible, and third, the soldiers manipulated that they would win, had 
begun to realize the contrary. (The Minister of State, Ministry of Defense 
(Lord Gilbert), 1999)After the bombing, Earl of Drogheda demanded to 
assume responsibility for potential Serbian causalities during the NATO 
bombing. (The Earl of Drogheda, 1999) The British government 
acknowledged that there had been civilian casualties in Serbia. Nevertheless, 
it was justified by simply being inadvertent, and this was a big difference 
compared to deliberate massacres of Milosevic in Kosovo. There was a lot of 
criticism in parliament concerning the bombing. It was considered a cause of 
encouragement for the Serbian government to undertake greater reprisals in 
Kosovo. It was not a very far-sighted policy of NATO. (The Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo, 2000) 
 Based on the propaganda that Slobodan was spreading in the country, 
several British MPs were also concerned about the support of some people to 
Milosevic. They stressed the need to make an anti-propaganda which would 
show people the truth. The people would see the true crimes and understand 
how they were being manipulated. However, the British government stated 
in parliament that our anti-propaganda consisted of two forms. Firstly, based 
on web pages in Serbian, and secondly, by throwing leaflets in Serbia 
indicating the massacres in Kosovo. (The Lord Privy Seal (Baroness Jay of 
Paddington), 1999) There was an increase of Serbian followers on the BBC 
website. The reactions were positive, and they were thankful for 
understanding the reality as it was. (Lord Newby, 1999) Protests had started 
again in Belgrade against Milosevic regime, and the British government 
considered them as a response to the information they were receiving. 
  The bombings began on 24 March 1999. However, starting from 
January the British MPs had urged the British government to intervene so 
that it stabilizes the situation. (Mr. Maples, 1999) It was confirmed by the 
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Ministry of Defense in February when the Rambouillet talks had begun. 
Nevertheless, many other MPs were against this action. They knew that 
Serbia was not Iraq, and it was a nation which had fought for its position 
since 1914. (Lord Burnham, 1999) They also knew that such an action would 
require many weeks, and eventually would take a lot of lives. (The Lord 
Privy Seal (Baroness Jay of Paddington), 1999) By the end of April, it was 
announced that troops would only be for peacekeeping purposes. In fact, 
Wesley Clark had asked in early March for an Anglo –American troop 
intervention to stabilize the situation in the country. (William M. Arkin, 
2001) However, after the NATO summit, which was held in Chicago in 
April 1999, the British Foreign Minister Robin Cook said that the best thing 
to do was to add land forces. (Benjamin S. Lambeth, 2001) 
 Among NATO members, there was a dilemma whether to intervene 
with land forces or not, and the most diligent members to intervene was the 
UK. (Charlotte Wagnsson, 2008) In the beginning, there were objections 
from Americans who were not very supportive of land intervention. The 
tension between the close allies was created, when Blair declared that we 
will intervene without American help. (John Norris, 2005) It was also 
reflected in Parliament in May when the supporters of intervention were 
prevailing. It might have happened because they were already tired of 
waiting for a quick solution based on bombing. The Minister of Defense 
declared that they would enter the country with an army until winter, and 
some supporters justified this approach that if Milosevic entered Kosovo 
with the Army to murder, we do have the right to enter the country to protect 
the civilian population. (Lord Mayhew of Twysden, 1999) However, as 
events unfolded during early June, fortunately, there was no need to 
intervene with land forces in Kosovo as well as in Serbia. 
 There were different viewpoints towards Albanians or Albanian 
armed groups in the country as was the case of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA). To reduce the consequences of the Serbian army in the country, they 
did not require involving KLA in combat, because it was accused of 
receiving weapons from the Albanian border in early January, and for this 
situation, the best thing to do was to monitor this part of the border. (Lord 
Hylton, 1999) The leaders of Anglo-American politics did not favorably see 
KLA’ provocations to the Serbian army. To Clinton, it posed a problem. 
While, the British Prime Minister Tony Blair believed this provocation could 
have its negative impact on Kosovo citizens who believed that the 
consequences could fall on civilians. (Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. 
O’Hanlon, 2001) There are even some of those MPs who said that guns were 
bought with profits from drugs dealing and prostitution. (Lord Redesdale, 
1999) The same standpoint concerning Kosovo had the representative of 
president Jelcin, Victor Chernomyrdin, who could collect amounts of money 
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reaching up to one billion dollars. (ShaqirVukaj, 2007) The Minister of 
Defense George Robertson said that this army was terrorizing the civilian 
population for revenge. (The Secretary of State for Defense (Mr. George 
Robertson), 1999) By the end of May, the British government was not 
satisfied with the KLA, which had not yet reduced the number of attacks. 
(The Minister of State, Ministry of Defense (Lord Gilbert), 1999) In early 
June, there were also talks for its demilitarization, and since the beginning of 
March, the KLA was required to leave the military combat. The army had to 
be dispersed by the end of the bombing. The number of soldiers of this 
organization amounted up to 18 000 people. From this number, an amount of 
3000 people available at all time during the wars. (James Pettifer, 2013) 
Even though commanders of the KLA had always publicly declared that they 
had never treated civilians badly, (Hajredin Muja, 2012) they were still 
criticized for their deeds and were asked to stop their activity. The purpose of 
this criticism was on the ground that NATO forces being the only force to 
fight in this war, and there was an increasing demand to impede the land 
fighting. It was also believed that the withdrawal of this army as a combat 
party could somehow reduce the counter-response of Serbian military 
fighting. 
 There was a special standpoint toward Albania. Being well connected 
regarding the ethnic and geostrategic position of the two countries, they 
knew this war would have a double impact on the territory of Kosovo as well 
as Albania. One of the main problems discussed in this case was the 
weapons’ trade. Officials of the British Foreign Ministry, as well as other 
deputies, claimed that they had evidence that some of the munitions taken by 
the KLA came from Albania. (The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean), 
1999) These people, being experts in political conditions in which Albania 
was and considering the same national feelings among Albanians and people 
of Kosovo, knew that it was impossible to ban it to the Albanian state. For 
them, the only solution was to close the Albanian– Yugoslavian border (i.e. 
the part with Kosovo). British soldiers would be deployed in that part of the 
border. This action would curb the flow of weapons. (Baroness Williams of 
Crosby, 1999) It was particularly demanded especially after the Racak 
massacre since the counter response could be greater from Kosovo. 
Therefore, this conduct would ban potential human massacre. The British 
Parliament also requested Albania to hold off military and political actions 
since the end of March 1999, especially after the start of the bombing. They 
feared the domino effect that this war could have in the Balkans. (Lord Judd, 
1999) Because of the location of Kosovo between two countries with 
Albanian populations, as Albania and Macedonia are, war could expand in 
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these areas as well. Albania was especially in chaos by internal political 
factors during that period. (Baroness Williams of Crosby, 1999) 
 The aspect of emigration of Kosovars, considering the human and 
health aid, was delegated to Albania. Albania had granted a humanitarian aid 
beyond its capacity considering all the problems it was facing as assessed by 
the British Parliament. The Parliament was also considering if Albania was 
properly assisted during this war. (The Earl of Sandwich, 1999) The future of 
Kosovo on an international arena was a crucial problem discussed in 
different stages during the war. The destiny of Kosovo, the establishment of 
a political status in Kosovo and the two alternatives in case the country 
would remain under the political integrity of Yugoslavia with autonomy or 
become independent.  The autonomy was undeniable for the British 
government and deputies. However, the autonomy was nonnegotiable to the 
Serbian party. (Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale, 1999) There were deputies in 
the parliament who knew Serbian viewpoints and politics, and they knew 
what Yugoslavia had done for half a century.  They also knew that Serbia 
had never accepted this despite the huge attempts of Tito to establish a 
federal republic under the Yugoslavian authority. (Baroness Ryder of 
Warsaw, 1999) The idea of a broad autonomy continued until the end of May 
even when the standpoint of Serbian party was not changing. The people 
were also asked to return home safe. However, the possibility of Kosovo to 
become an independent state was negotiated. (Lord Weatherill, 1999) 
 
Human reintegration and ethnic balance in Kosovo 
 This form of declaration was done intentionally to pacify the Serbian 
reaction. Therefore, the idea of autonomy was still mentioned in order not to 
diminish the territorial integrity of Serbia and, at the same time, not to 
jeopardize the life of civilians from Yugoslavia, in case there were early 
declarations of independence. It would also stop emotionally- driven actions 
of the people of Kosovo after this declaration. Nevertheless, Serbians would 
be blamed for not accepting a multi-ethnic Kosovo. (Mr. Cook, 1999) This 
declaration given by Mr. Cook denoted that the ethnic cleansing undertaken 
by the Serbian army was seen as a reaction showing their concern if 
recognizing this nation as comprised of other people other than Serbians. 
Nevertheless, Western diplomats, including the British ones had left some 
room for discussions for an independent Kosovo in the future. It was firstly 
agreed upon a period of 3 months to allow KFOR soldiers in Kosovo with 
the number reaching over 4000, (Mr. Cook, 1999) and later on having a 
discussion on a referendum. Apparently, it was believed that many 
aggressive elements would be more accommodating from both sides during 
this stage and Serbs could have the chance to change their views after 
Milosevic left, as they were also being asked to from time to time. It would 
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lead to independence accompanied by a peaceful acceptance, as an 
existential precondition for both political entities- Serbia and Kosovo. It was 
not the right moment to openly discuss the independence of Kosovo rather 
than the lack of willingness to proclaim it as an independent country. A 
declaration of this kind would act as an incentive rather than a positive 
reaction to the situation since the war was at its peak. The emergence of a 
human sentiment was very important in the course of the talks of the British 
Parliament concerning the refugees. Its biggest impact was the devastation of 
the country and the emergence of refugees during the ethnic cleansing of the 
war. The concern for Kosovo refugees in this parliament was 
multidimensional.  
 Firstly, the British people had collected about 10 million pounds as 
soon as war broke. The money was collected from the propaganda of many 
MPs in cooperation with NGOs. (Baroness Jay of Paddington, 1999)  They 
involved British military aircraft being present in Macedonia because they 
were concerned about the safety of human beings. The aircraft monitored the 
people and kept them safe from the Serbian army attacks. (Lord Kenet, 1999) 
They sought to go beyond just military action so that they could safeguard 
refugees even though NATO had not declared its troop involvement in 
Kosovo. In hearings on this issue, it was occasionally requested that all the 
food wasted in the country to be used in order to help the refugees. (Baroness 
Rawlings, 1999) The British camps in Macedonia had collaborated with the 
Bulgarians to stock fast and good quality food supplies. Bulgaria, a country 
close to Macedonia asked by the British to create refugee camps. (Baroness 
Rawlings, 1999) Many young men of Kosovo tried to pass the border and 
move to the UK. They were imprisoned because they were not equipped with 
the right travel documents. The British parliament did not consider it as the 
right approach. They believed that these actions were done for specific 
reasons, and the best approach was to free them and give the status of an 
asylum seeker. (Baroness Williams of Crosby, 1999) 
 In order to facilitate the procedures to enter Europe, there was a 
demand to issue the Nansen passport. (Baroness Park of Monmouth, 1999) 
Since Kosovo people had been travelling with Serbian travel documents, 
Serbia had restricted their travelling outside the country. In this way, Nansen 
passport was proposed in order to avoid the chaos that could be created when 
it came to the legal aspect of their emigration. This passport was first issued 
by the League of Nations during the 20s of the 20th century. (Nansen 
passport, 2015) The British government tried to be cautious by not entering 
the Kosovo’s land with the army. Such a positioning would lead to a Serbian 
reaction, and civilians would be the one to pay for it with casualties. They 
even declared that this would be done in cooperation with the USA to bring 
some relief to the people of Kosovo. 
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 The special treatment of refugees was another important concern. 
There was a proposal to bring women and children to EU countries since 
April (including the UK), until the end of the war. (Lord Evans of Parkside, 
1999) However, used to the idea of the constant threat of invasion for 
decades and centuries, the concept of relating their destiny to that of their 
land was deeply embedded in refugees. They refused to go to areas far away 
from the border of Kosovo, even if they were offered better conditions by 
countries overseas. They wanted to be close to Kosovo so they could easily 
go back to the war. (Baroness Amos, 1999) The number of Kosovo citizens 
who had emigrated was high in early May as refugees in camps built by 
NATO countries and NGOs was over 400,000 people in Albania and around 
200 000 people in Macedonia. In all these camps there was assistance in 
personnel and logistics supported by the British. Despite this great support, 
MPs in the parliament sought to assist refugees further. Many MPs, recalling 
previous experiences in times of political crisis that had created an influx of 
emigrants, asked the help of universities to give their support via their study 
programs; as they had previously done with the refugee crisis from 
Czechoslovakia. (Lord Quirk, 1999)  
 The British government also facilitated the connection of different 
immigrants who were in the UK with the rest of the refugees. (Baroness 
Amos, 1999) This action would enable some spiritual relief to ease the pain 
of war. The spiritual relief for the refugees was done hand in hand with the 
military operations by NATO. It had a direct impact on the population of 
Kosovo, as was the impact of the bombing later on. However, all political or 
military steps were firstly considered based on the importance of ethnic 
relationships. One of the states that carefully considered the balance between 
the two groups and the Serbians was Great Britain. This approach was also 
clearly expressed in the British Parliament. They knew that different Serbian 
groups would start ethnic hatred with other groups once Milosevic came into 
power, and this war itself was a result of this approach followed since the 
1980s. (Lord McNair, 1999) 
 But hatred was not manifested only by Serbians. It was equivalent in 
both ethnic groups- Serbs and Albanians. The latter experiencing a 
disappointment lasting for decades in Yugoslavia had accumulated a great 
hatred and pressure against the Serbian people. In most cases, the hatred was 
due to several reasons and these reasons were accompanied by facts. They 
knew that both parts would hate each other; even after the war. (Lord 
Crickhowell, 1999) Since the Rambouillet talks, they had realized that 
neither side would want to establish tolerant diplomatic actions. However, 
the Serbs did not want to give a solution, while the Albanians did not tolerate 
any element. (John Norris, 2005) 
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 NGOs, as well as KFOR troop, were going to Kosovo to prevent any 
ethnic confrontation since both sides could fall into conflict. The British 
government was aware that the hatred was part of both sides. (Lord Evans of 
Watford, 1999) 
 They already feared a revenge coming from Kosovo people who were 
burdened by the psychoses of tragic memories that had experienced, and they 
could create turmoil with the Serbian population in Kosovo after being freed 
from Serbian constraints as well as under the protection of the international 
presence. Fortunately, the population was peaceful after the war, except 
sporadic cases. 
 The MPs, who were responsible for humanitarian intervention, were 
trying to maintain the balance in the belief of keeping every civilian safe. By 
the beginning of May, the importance of the Serbs’ safety in both Serbia and 
Kosovo began to gain interest. This concern was not only mentioned in the 
British Parliament, but also in the European Youth Parliament. (Lord Ponson 
by of Shulbrede, 1999) The House of Lords also required that all the people 
affected by this war had to be helped, which meant the Serbian civilian 
population wherever it was. Whereas in early June, when it seemed that 
everything was being successfully completed, and this success would be on 
the side of Kosovars, the safety of everything related to Serbian culture and 
the Serbian people in Kosovo became a great concern.  
 It was required to create a commission to protect the Serbian values 
in Kosovo.  A Serbian person had to be in the commission’s composition to 
provide information about these areas. (Lord Gilbert, 1999) The British, with 
the will to bring back harmony and encourage the recovery of Kosovo as a 
whole,  started rebuilding homes as a sign of charity in new Serbian towns in 
Kosovo after the war and gave them historical names as it was the case of 
Obilic. (Tim Judah, 2008) 
 This important stage for Kosovo was discussed by the British 
parliamentary politics. In many cases, the parliament had an impact on 
British national policy as well as internationally. Many events that had to do 
with the war in Kosovo, for many people the political involvement of 
government and high-esteemed British personalities or those of Western 
policies is taken into consideration. However, one should acknowledge the 
contribution and the persistence of the two chambers of the British 
parliament. This state with an eight- hundred- year- old parliament 
recognized its realm in the policy-making of that moment. Their activity 
more than anything else is seen as a balancing power toward governmental 
actions. On a larger scale as corrective toward military policy. Whereas other 
cases were a good example of British humanitarian values, particularly in 
safeguarding human and political balances among groups. This parliament 
influenced greatly on the achievement of positive outcomes. 
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